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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR OVERSTATEMENTS OF BASIS  
Richard T. Rice, Esquire 
Retired Member, Womble Carlye Sandridge & Rice, LLP 
Winston-Salem, NC 
 
I. QUESTION PRESENTED 
In United States of America v. Home Concrete and 
Supply, LLC,__U.S__, 132 S.Ct. 1836, 182 L.Ed.2d 746 
(2012), the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
following issue: 
Whether the IRS has three years or six 
years to assess a deficiency against a 
taxpayer when the taxpayer overstates his 
basis in property that he has sold, 
thereby understating the gain that he 
received from its sale. 
On April 25, 2012, the Supreme Court followed its prior 
holding in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958) 
by holding that the three year - not the six year - statute 
applies.   
II. THE STATUTE 
The Internal Revenue Code requires the IRS to assess 
additional tax within three years of the date a tax return 
is filed, unless a statutory exception applies.  26 U.S.C. 
§ 6501(a) (2000 ed.).  The exception that became the focus 
in the Home Concrete case is the one found in 26 U.S.C. § 
6501(e)(1)(A) which extends the three year period to six 
years when a taxpayer: 
omits from gross income an amount properly 
includable therein which is in excess of 25 
percent of the amount of gross income stated in 
the return.   
A. The quoted language is materially 
indistinguishable1 from the provision 
originally enacted by Congress in 1934 when 
                                                 
1 In 1954, “percentum” was replaced with “percent.”  See 26 U.S.C. § 
6501(e)(1)(A) (2000 ed.). 
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the normal three year limitations period was 
extended from three years to five years for 
cases involving taxpayer omissions from gross 
income.  26 U.S.C. § 275(c) (1940 ed.).   
B. The relevant version of the statute for the 
Home Concrete case was recodified in 1954, 
when Congress reenacted the entire Internal 
Revenue Code.  As mentioned, the quoted 
provision was carried forward and recodified 
as §6501(e)(1)(A).2  However, Congress also 
added two new subparagraphs to §6501(e)(1)(A), 
which provided: 
For purposes of this subparagraph -  
(i) in the case of a trade or 
business, the term “gross 
income” means the total of the 
amounts received or accrued from 
the sale of goods or services 
(if such amounts are required to 
be shown on the return) prior to 
diminution by the cost of such 
sales or services; and 
(ii) in determining the amount 
omitted from gross income, there 
shall not be taken into account 
any amount which is omitted from 
gross income stated in the 
return if such amount is 
disclosed in the return, or in a 
statement attached to the 
return, in a manner adequate to 
appraise the Secretary or his 
delegate of the nature and 
amount of such item. 
III. CASE LAW BEFORE COLONY 
The meaning of the phrase “omits from gross income an 
amount properly includable therein” was the subject of 
                                                 
2 The new statute changed the extension from two years to three. 
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considerable litigation before the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue in Colony, as follows: 
A. In Reis v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d. 900 (6th 
Cir. 1944), the Sixth Circuit found that there 
was an omission from gross income where the 
taxpayer in question overstated his basis in 
certain pieces of property that he sold, thus 
extending the statute of limitations from 
three years to five years.   
B. In Uptegrove Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 204 
F.2d. 570 (3rd Cir. 1953), the Third Circuit 
addressed the same language in a case where 
the taxpayer was a manufacturing corporation 
that inappropriately included a reserve for 
retroactive wage increases in its cost of 
goods sold - thus, arriving at an incorrect 
gross profit from sales.  After reviewing the 
legislative history, the Third Circuit 
concluded that: 
The history of Section 275(c) 
persuasively indicates that Congress 
was addressing itself particularly 
to the situation where a taxpayer 
shall fail to include some receipt 
or accrual in his computation of 
gross income and not in a more 
general way to errors of whatever 
kind in that computation. 
Id. at 572. 
Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the 
three year, not the five year, statute of 
limitations applied. 
C. The Ninth, Fifth and Eighth Circuits agreed 
with Uptegrove Lumber, holding that the 
statute of limitations could not be extended 
in situations where the taxpayers included 
their gross receipts, but erred in their 
computation of taxable incomes.  See Slaff v. 
Commissioner, 220 F.2d. 65 (9th Cir. 1955); 
4 
 
Davis v. Hightower, 230 F.2d. 549 (5th Cir. 
1956); Goodenow v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d. 20 
(8th Cir. 1956). 
IV. THE COLONY DECISION 
A. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Colony involved a situation where the taxpayer 
allegedly “understated the gross profits on 
the sales of certain lots of land for 
residential purposes as a result of having 
overstated the “basis” of such lots by 
erroneously including in their costs certain 
unallowable items of development expense.”  
357 U.S. at 30.   
After the Tax Court found that the extended 
(five year) statute should apply, the Sixth 
Circuit again faced the question it had 
addressed in Reis thirteen years earlier.  
Despite the clear conflict in interpretation 
of the statute with the Third, Fifth, Eighth 
and Ninth Circuits, the Sixth circuit adhered 
to this earlier ruling, noting that the 
“reasoning of these cases is not without 
considerable persuasive force, and if the 
question were here for the first time, we 
might be disposed to follow them.”  Colony, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 
1957).  However, because of Reis Sixth Circuit 
declined to follow the other circuits and 
affirmed the Tax Court’s decision.   
B. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS 
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court 
began its review with the “critical statutory 
language, “omits from gross income an amount 
properly includable therein.”  Id. at 32.  The 
IRS argued that the Court should focus on the 
word “amount” which suggested a concentration 
on a quantitative aspect of the error - i.e., 
whether or not gross income was understated by 
as much as 25 percent.  The Supreme Court 
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noted that “[t]his view is somewhat reinforced 
if, in reading the above -- quoted phrase, one 
touches lightly on the word “omits” and bears 
down hard on the words “gross income,” for 
where a cost item is overstated, as in the 
case before us, gross income is affected to 
the same degree as when a gross-receipt item 
of the same amount is completely omitted from 
the tax return.”  Id. 
The taxpayer, on the other hand, argued that 
the IRS’s reading failed to take full account 
of the word “omits,” which Congress selected 
when it could have chosen something else, 
such as “reduces” or “understates.”   
The Court agreed with the taxpayer’s argument 
that “omit” is to be given the standard 
dictionary definition:  “to leave out or 
unmentioned; not to insert, include or name.”  
Relying on this definition, the  taxpayer 
argued that the statute should be limited to 
situations in which specific receipts or 
accruals of income are left out of the 
computation of gross income.  The Supreme 
Court agreed with this position.  Id. at 33.   
While the Court preferred the taxpayer’s 
interpretation, it did note that “it cannot 
be said that the language is unambiguous.”Id.  
In order to resolve any ambiguity, the Court 
turned to the legislative history of the 
statute.  When it did so, the Court found in 
that history “persuasive evidence that 
Congress was addressing itself to the 
specific situation where a taxpayer actually 
omitted some receipt or accrual in its 
computation of gross income, and not more 
generally to errors in that computation 
arising from other causes.”  Id.   
Justice Harlan, who wrote for the Court, said 
that in enacting the provision: 
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Congress manifested no broader 
purpose than to give the 
Commissioner an additional two [now 
three] years to investigate tax 
returns in cases where, because of a 
taxpayer’s omission to report some 
tangible item, the Commissioner is 
at a special disadvantage in 
detecting errors. … [W]hen, as here, 
the understatement of a tax arises 
from an error in reporting an item 
disclosed on the face of the return 
the Commissioner is at no such 
disadvantage.  And this would seem 
to be so whether the error be one 
affecting “gross income” or one, 
such as overstated deductions, 
affecting other parts of the return.  
To accept the Commissioner’s 
interpretation and to impose a five-
year limitation when such errors 
affect “gross income,” but a three-
year limitation when they do not, 
not only would be to read § 275(c) 
more broadly than as justified by 
the evident reason for its 
enactment, but also to create a 
patent incongruity in the tax law.  
Id. 
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth 
Circuit and sided with the Third, Fifth, 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits in its construction 
of the phrase “omits from income” to mean 
failure to include specific receipts or 
accrual of income in excess of 25 percent of 
the amount stated in the return, and not where 
the income and receipts are all stated but 
then reduced by an overly large basis as 
disclosed on a return.   
The Court also noted that, while it was 
construing former Section 275(c) of the 1939 
Tax Code, “we observe that the conclusion that 
7 
 
we reach is in harmony with the unambiguous 
language of § 6501(e)(1)(A) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954.”  Id. at 38. 
V. HISTORY AFTER COLONY 
A. LAW BEFORE 2000 
For a number of years following Colony, the 
issue of extending the statute of limitations 
from three years to six in an “overstated 
basis” case appeared to have been settled.  
Other than attempting to distinguish Colony in 
a few other cases, the IRS seemed content to 
abide by the Court’s ruling.  See, e.g., 
Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680 (6th Cir.), 
cert denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); CC&FW 
Operations Ltd. v. Commissioner, 273 F.3d 402 
(1st Cir. 2001).  In 1976, the IRS recognized 
Colony  as “[t]he landmark” case construing § 
6501(e), while acknowledging that Colony’s 
holding is “in harmony with” § 6501(e)(1)(A).  
IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 36856 (Sept. 21, 1976).  
B. SON-OF-BOSS 
The IRS’s position on Colony changed, however, 
in the early 2000s, with the advent of a 
transaction that became known as “Son-of-
BOSS.”  In a Son-of-BOSS transaction a 
taxpayer uses some mechanism, often a short 
sale, to increase his basis in an asset before 
the asset is sold.  In August 2000, the IRS 
issued notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, which 
set forth, in some detail, the IRS’s position 
that tax consequences claimed by taxpayers in 
connection with Son-of-BOSS transactions were 
contrary to the intent of the Code.  The IRS 
contended – and several courts have agreed – 
that these transactions lacked “economic 
substance” and, in the ensuing months and 
years, the IRS took several steps to identify 
and educate its examiners about transactions 
fitting the Son-of-BOSS pattern.  Brief for 
Respondents p. 10. 
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Meanwhile, the IRS began an aggressive program 
of asserting tax deficiencies related to Son-
of-BOSS in similar transactions, even when the 
three year limitations period had expired.  In 
such cases, the IRS advanced the argument that 
the Supreme Court  holding in Colony applied 
only in the context of the sale of goods or 
services by a trade or business and not to a 
taxpayer’s basis in property.  The Tax Court 
rejected that argument, and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.  Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. 
Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2009).  
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Ninth 
Circuit.  Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 
573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009).   
VI. FACTS RELEVANT TO HOME CONCRETE 
A. Home Concrete began as a small business in 
Salisbury, North Carolina that had been in 
operation for more than 50 years before the 
transactions at issue in the case occurred.  
Robert Pierce and Stephen Chandler became the 
principal owners and day-to-day managers of 
the company in 1985.  By 1999, Mr. Pierce, who 
owned approximately 81% of the outstanding 
shares, decided to retire and sell the 
business.  Being a small business owner with 
no expertise in such matters, Pierce sought 
financial planning advice from several highly 
recommended financial and legal professionals.  
Upon advice from those professionals, the 
following transactions occurred prior to the 
sale of the business: 
(1)  Home Concrete & Supply, LLC was 
formed on April 15, 1999.  Home 
Concrete’s initial members were 
Pierce, Chandler, Home Oil, and two 
trusts for the benefit of Pierce’s 
children (collectively, the 
“partners”).   
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(2)  On May 13, 1999, each partner 
commenced a short sale of Treasury 
notes.    
(3)  On May 17, 1999, each partner 
contributed the proceeds from the 
short sales of Treasury notes, 
together with the short Treasury 
note positions and margin cash, to 
Home Concrete as capital 
contributions.    
(4)  On May 18, 1999, Home Concrete 
closed its Treasury note short 
positions by purchasing Treasury 
notes in the open market.   
(5)  On June 11, 1999, Home Oil 
transferred substantially all of its 
business assets to Home Concrete as 
a capital contribution.    
(6)  On June 14, 1999, each partner 
transferred a percentage of its 
membership interests in Home 
Concrete to Home Oil as a capital 
contribution to Home Oil.    
(7)  In connection with such transfers, 
Home Concrete made an election 
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 754 to step 
up the basis of its assets.    
(8)  On August 31, 1999, Home Concrete 
sold substantially all of its assets 
to a third party for a gross sales 
price of $10,623,348.  
Brief for Respondents, pp. 12-13. 
Home Concrete timely filed its partnership tax 
return on or before April 17, 2000.  That 
return reported the sale of Home Concrete’s 
assets, including the gross sales price 
($10,623,348), the partnership’s original 
basis ($4,542,824.36), the election to adjust 
its basis, and the resulting stepped-up basis 
($10,527,350.53).  Home Concrete  
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also attached Form 8594 (Asset Acquisition 
Statement Under Section 1060), on which it 
reported the third-party purchaser’s 
information and the fair market value of the 
sold assets.  Brief for Respondents p. 13.  
The partners also filed their returns which, 
among other things, disclosed that “during the 
year the proceeds of a short sale not closed 
by the taxpayer were received.”  Id. at 14.  
For unknown reasons, the IRS did not begin 
auditing Home Concrete’s 1999 return until 
almost six years after it was filed.  In a 
letter dated February 23, 2006, the IRS 
notified Mr. Pierce that Home Concrete’s 
return had “been selected for examination” 
because of a Son-of-BOSS transaction.  On 
September 7, 2006, the IRS issued a Notice of 
Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment 
(FPAA), in which the IRS asserted that Home 
Concrete’s claimed basis in the sale of its 
assets was grossly overstated.  The IRS did 
not allege that the 1999 returns were 
fraudulent.  Id.   
VII. THE HOME CONCRETE LITIGATION 
A. On December 5, 2006, Home Concrete filed a 
Complaint in the Eastern District of North 
Carolina, seeking a declaration that the FPAA 
was bared by the three year statute of 
limitations.  In addition to declaratory 
relief, Mr. Pierce (the tax matters partner) 
sought the return of $1,392,118 he deposited 
with the Court, plus any accrued interest.  
The IRS argued that the FPAA was timely 
because the six year statute of limitations 
contained in § 6501(e)(1)(A) had not run.  
Both parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. 
B. On March 9, 2009, the district court agreed 
with the IRS, granting partial summary 
judgment in its favor and rejecting Home 
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Concrete’s argument that Colony required a 
different result. 
VIII. THE NEW TREASURARY REGULATIONS 
A. In September 2009, during the pendency of the 
Home Concrete case, and following losses on 
this issue in the Ninth and Federal Circuits, 
the IRS issued new temporary regulations under 
§ 65013, purporting to limit the statutory 
language at issue in Colony to situations 
involving the sale of goods or services by a 
trade or business.  74 Fed. Reg. 49, 321 
(September 28, 2009). 
B. In December, 2010, the IRS withdrew the 
temporary regulations and issued virtually 
identical final regulations.  755 Fed. Reg. 
78, 897 (December 17, 2010). 
IX. FOURTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN HOME CONCRETE AND CIRCUIT 
SPLIT 
A. On February 7, 2011, the Fourth Circuit 
reversed the trial court, concluding that the 
Supreme Court decision in Colony “forecloses 
the argument that Home Concrete’s overstated 
basis in its reporting of the short sale 
proceeds resulted in an omission from its 
reported gross income.”  Home Concrete and 
Supply, LLC v. U.S., 634 F.3d 249, 255 (4th 
Cir. 2011).  The Fourth Circuit also refused 
to apply the new IRS regulations retroactively 
because the regulations appear to be 
prospective only and purported “to establish a 
rule contrary to Colony to subject the 
                                                 
3 In 1982, Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982 (TEFRA), which created a unified procedure for determining the tax 
treatment of all partnership items at the partnership level.  TEFRA added 
§ 6229(c)(2), which contains language substantively identical to that of 
§ 6501(e)(1)(A), but applies only to partnerships.  Section 6229(c)(2) does 
not contain the language that appears in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of 
§ 6501(e)(1)(A).  The new temporary and final regulations discussed herein 
purport to apply to § 6229 as well as § 6501. 
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taxpayers to the extended limitations period 
ten years later.”  Id. at 257.   
B. Judge Wilkinson joined the Court’s opinion in 
full but wrote separately to stress that the 
IRS’ attempt to limit the holding in Colony 
“pass[es] the point where the beneficial 
application of agency expertise gives way to a 
lack of accountability and risk of 
arbitrariness.”  Id. at 259. 
C. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Home Concrete 
was in accord with decisions from the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits.  See Bakersfield Energy 
Partners, LP v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 
(9th Cir. 2009); Burks v. United States, 633 
F.3d 1347 (5th Cir. 2011).  By contrast, the 
Seventh, Tenth and DC Circuits adopted the 
IRS’ view and/or followed the new regulations, 
thus declining to following Colony.  See Beard 
v Commissioner, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 647 F.3d 
929 (10th Cir. 2011); Intermountain Insurance 
Services of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner, 650 
F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011).4 
Thus, there was a clear conflict among the 
circuits when the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Home Concrete. 
X. THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
A. IRS Arguments.  The IRS focused on three 
arguments:    
(1) The Code defines “gross income” for 
federal tax purposes as all income 
from whatever source derived, 
specifically including “gains 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, the Federal Circuit had an intra-circuit conflict in that it 
held in favor of the taxpayers with respect to the application of Colony 
before the IRS regulations became final but ruled against the taxpayers after 
the regulations took effect.  See Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States, 573 
F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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derived from dealings in real 
property,” which, in turn, is 
defined as “the excess of the amount 
realized over the unrecovered cost 
or other basis for the property sold 
or exchanged.”  26 U.S.C. 
§ 61(a)(3).  Because a gain on a 
sale of property is determined by 
subtracting the taxpayer’s basis 
from the sale price, a taxpayer can 
improperly report income from a 
property sale either by overstating 
his basis in the property or by 
understating the property’s sale 
price.  In this case, the taxpayer 
“stepped-up” its basis pursuant to 
the Son-of-BOSS transaction 
described above.  According to the 
IRS, overstating basis has the same 
effect as understating the 
partnership’s sale price.  Both 
scenarios, according to the IRS, fit 
squarely into the definition of an 
“omission from gross income.”   
(2) The IRS argued that two adjacent 
statutory provisions within Section 
6501(e) support the conclusion that 
an overstatement of basis amounts to 
an omission from gross income:   
(a) Subparagraph (i) of Section 
6501(e)(1)(A), added in 
1954, creates an 
“exception” to the general 
rule that applies only to a 
trade or business.  That 
subparagraph, according to 
the IRS, was enacted to 
eliminate the possibility 
that a trade or business 
could trigger the six year 
assessment period by 
overstating its basis in 
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property sold.  This 
special rule for trades and 
businesses would be 
unnecessary, according to 
the IRS, if the phrase 
“omits from gross income an 
amount properly included 
therein” already excluded 
understatements of income 
attributable to 
overstatements of basis.  
Brief for the United 
States, p. 21. 
(b) Section 6501(e)(2), which 
applies to estate and gift 
taxes, gives the IRS six 
years from the filing of a 
return to assess additional 
tax “if the taxpayer omits 
. . . items includable” in 
the gross estate.  26 
U.S.C. § 6501(e)(2) 
(emphasis added).  
According to the IRS, 
Congress used the term 
“items” to “make it clear 
that the six-year period is 
not to apply merely because 
of differences between the 
taxpayer and the Government 
as to valuation of 
property.”  Brief for the 
United States, p. 23.  By 
contrast, Section 
6501(e)(1)(A) provides for 
a six year assessment 
period “if the taxpayer 
omits from gross income an 
amount properly includable 
therein.”  26 U.S.C. 
§ 6501(e)(1)(A) (emphasis 
added).  The IRS argued 
that Congress’s reference 
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to “amounts” rather than 
“items” strongly suggests 
that the six year 
assessment period applies 
both in cases where an item 
of income is completely 
left off and situations 
where the amount of gross 
income is understated due 
to an error in the 
calculation.  Id.   
(3) Finally, the IRS argued that the new 
regulations resolve the dispute in 
the IRS’s favor once and for all.  
Colony was construing the older 
statute, not the new one; and the 
Court expressly stated that it was 
not addressing the statute as 
enacted in 1954.  In any event, 
Colony recognized that the statutory 
language was ambiguous, thus leaving 
room for the IRS to clarify the 
ambiguity by regulation, which 
regulation is, in turn, entitled to 
deference under Chevron USA, Inc. v. 
MRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  See Mayo 
of Foundation v. United States, 131 
S. Ct. 704 (2011); National Cable & 
Telecoms Association v. Brand X 
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 
(2005).5   
B. Taxpayer Arguments.  The taxpayer rebutted the 
IRS arguments as follows: 
(1) Colony controls the outcome of this 
case.  Colony construed the very 
language at issue in this case in 
the taxpayer’s favor, holding that 
an overstatement of basis does not 
                                                 
5 There were additional arguments, argued vigorously by both sides, regarding 
the promulgation, effective date and retroactivity of the new regulations, 
but these were not reached by the Supreme Court.     
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constitute an omission from gross 
income in order to extend the 
statute of limitations.  The IRS’s 
reliance on the Code’s definition of 
“gross income” is the same argument 
that the IRS made in the Supreme 
Court in Colony which was rejected 
because the Court chose to focus 
instead on the word “omits,” which 
is not defined in the Code but is 
instead entitled to its ordinary 
meaning, which the Court said means 
“to leave out” or “to fail to 
include or mention.”  Brief for 
Respondents, p. 23.  In this case, 
the taxpayer included all income and 
receipts from the sale of its 
business on its return, as well as 
including the original basis, the 
election to step up the basis, and 
the increased basis on the face of 
the return.  Thus, under Colony, 
there was no “omission” at all. 
(2) The relevant statutory language 
“omits from gross income an amount 
properly includable therein” was 
enacted in 1934 and carried forward 
by Congress not only in the 1954 
Code but also through a total of six 
substantive amendments to the 1954 
Code thereafter.  Brief for 
Respondents, p. 9.   
(3) Subparagraph (i) to Section 
6501(e)(1)(A) is not an “exception” 
to the general rule but rather a 
clarification of it.  That 
subparagraph was added shortly after 
the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Uptegrove Lumber v. Commissioner, 
204 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1953).  The 
Third Circuit decided that despite 
the definition of gross income and 
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the regulations for a manufacturing, 
merchandising or mining business, 
which included the total sales, less 
the cost of goods sold, the 
legislative history was clear that 
Congress intended to extend the 
statute only in situations where an 
item of income was left out, not 
when there was an error in the 
computation.  Thus, the Third 
Circuit decided the case in favor of 
the taxpayer, who happened to be a 
trade or business. The better, more 
sensible, explanation for the 
addition of (i) is simply that it 
was added to codify the result in 
Uptegrove Lumber in the context of a 
trade or business – because a need 
for a clarification in that 
particular circumstance had been 
brought to the attention of Congress 
immediately prior to enacting the 
new provision.  Brief in Opposition 
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
p. 22.   
Additionally, Colony cannot be 
limited in the way the IRS contends 
because Colony involved the sale of 
real property, which is neither a 
“good” nor a “service,” as referred 
to in (i).  Because subparagraph (i) 
would not have applied on the facts 
of Colony, it is inconceivable that 
the Supreme Court’s statement that 
its interpretation of the prior 
statute was “in harmony with” the 
new one embraced the government’s 
reading of the statute – which would 
wipe out Colony.  Brief for 
Respondents p. 32. 
(4) The IRS’s reliance on Section 
6501(e)(2) is misplaced.  Congress 
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added paragraph (e)(2) as part of 
the 1954 amendments, to cover estate 
and gift taxes.  This section has no 
application to income taxes.  
Moreover, Colony already considered 
the IRS’s “amount” argument and 
specifically rejected it.  
Congress’s post-Colony change in 
1965 to the heading of Section 6501 
– from “omission from gross income” 
to “substantial omission of items” – 
underscores that Congress understood 
and affirmatively endorsed the 
Colony holding.  Brief for 
Respondents, P. 35. 
(5) The new regulation does not, and 
cannot, compel a different result 
here.  The Court’s decision in 
Colony definitely declared “what the 
law is” with respect to the key 
statutory question at issue.  
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  Applying 
the traditional tools of statutory 
construction, the Supreme Court in 
Colony concluded that Congress had 
“directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue,” and had 
instructed that an “omission from 
gross income” occurred only when 
item of gross income had been left 
out entirely.  Brief for 
Respondents, P. 37.  For purposes of 
stare decisis, the statutory holding 
must govern.  Since the Court has 
spoken to the precise question at 
issue, there is no room for the 
agency to overrule Colony by 
“reinterpreting” the statute because 
there is no gap for the agency to 
fill.  For that reason alone, the 
IRS’s reliance on Brand X is 
misplaced.  Congress’s ratification 
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of the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation removes any doubt 
that the agency is not free to adopt 
a different one.  Brief for 
Respondent pp. 38-9.   
XI. SUPREME COURT DECISION 
In a five to four decision, with Justice Scalia filing 
a separate concurring opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in favor of the taxpayer.   
A. THE OPINION  
The Court agreed with the taxpayer that Colony 
determines the outcome of this case.  132 
S.Ct. at 1841.   The Justice Breyer, writing 
for the Court, said: 
The provision before us is a 1954 
reenactment of the 1939 provision 
that Colony interpreted.  The 
operative language is identical.  It 
would be difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to give the same 
language here a different 
interpretation without effectively 
overruling Colony, a course of 
action that basic principles of 
stare decisis wisely counsel us not 
to take.   
Id.  
The Court rejected the IRS’s argument that the 
inclusion of (i) in the relevant section and 
the mention of “items” in the gifts and 
estates section in the 1954 Code changes the 
outcome.  Justice wrote that “these points are 
too fragile to bear the significant 
argumentative weight the Government seeks to 
place upon them.”  Id.    
With respect to (i), the Court agreed with the 
taxpayer’s argument that a plausible reason 
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why Congress added (i) was to settle the then-
current debate over how the statute operated 
with respect to the sale of goods and services 
by a trade or business and to codify Uptegrove 
Lumber.  The Court also pointed out that (i) 
explains how to calculate whether or not the 
taxpayer has exceeded the 25 percent threshold 
in the trade or business context.  Id. at 
1842.   
The Court viewed the IRS’s argument regarding 
the estate and gift tax “item” language as an 
even weaker one.  The opinion pointed out that 
a similar argument had been raised and 
rejected by the Court in Colony itself.  As 
Justice Breyer put it: 
But to rely in the case before us on 
this solitary word change in a 
different subsection is like hoping 
that a new bat boy will change the 
outcome of the World Series.   
Id.    
Dealing with the IRS’s new regulation, the 
Court recognized the IRS’s argument that the 
regulation was entitled to Chevron deference 
but pointed out that the regulation is 
“entitled to Chevron deference only if the 
prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous 
terms of the statute … .  National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X 
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) 
(emphasis in original).”  Although the Court 
recognized that Colony itself had 
characterized the statute as “not 
unambiguous,” this did not mean that the IRS 
is automatically entitled to win the case by 
enacting the regulation: 
We do not accept this argument.  In 
our view, Colony has already 
interpreted the statute, and there 
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is no longer any different 
construction that is consistent with 
Colony and available for adoption by 
the agency. 
Id. at 1843.   
Although not joined by Justice Scalia in the 
remaining reasoning, the Court went on to 
explain why the IRS was not entitled to change 
the outcome where the statute had been 
declared “not unambiguous” in Colony.  The 
Court reasoned that it does not automatically 
follow from a pre-Chevron reference to a 
linguistic ambiguity that Congress has 
delegated gap-filling power to the agency.  
Id. at 1844.  This was true because the Colony 
court examined the statute carefully, finding 
that the taxpayer had the better side of the 
textual argument (regarding the definition of 
“omission”); and it examined the legislative 
history and concluded that Congress had 
decided the question definitively, leaving no 
room for the agency to reach a contrary 
result.  Id.   The Court also agreed with the 
Colony’s conclusion that the IRS’s 
interpretation would “create at patent 
incongruity in the tax law” (by treating 
overstated basis differently from overstated 
deductions).  Id.   Finally, Colony’s finding 
that its interpretation of the 1939 Code was 
“in harmony with the [now] unambiguous 
language” of the 1954 Code, suggests that the 
Colony Court saw nothing in the new Code as 
being inconsistent with its conclusion.  Id.    
Thus, the Court reasoned that the Court in 
Colony concluded that the statute left no gap 
to be filled by the IRS.  The Court concluded:   
Given principles of stare decisis, 
we must follow [Colony’s] 
interpretation.  And there being no 
gap to fill, the government’s gap-
filling regulation cannot change 
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Colony’s interpretation of the 
statute.  We agree with the taxpayer 
that overstatements of basis, and 
not the resulting understatement of 
gross income, do not trigger the 
extended limitations period of 
§ 6501(e)(1)(A).   
Id.    
B. JUSTICE SCALIA’S CONCURRENCE 
Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred 
in the judgment.  In his view, Colony 
determines the outcome in this case because of 
“justifiable taxpayer reliance” on that 
decision.   
However, Justice Scalia took the opportunity 
to amplify his dissent in Brand X by pointing 
out the difficulty in evaluating the 
ambiguous/non-ambiguous determination of 
statutes made in cases decided pre-Chevron.  
He pointed out that pre-Chevron Courts had no 
idea that their rulings might be changed by an 
agency regulation if they found the statute to 
be ambiguous.  Id. at 1846.  He also argued 
that the plurality’s rationale for finding 
that there was no gap to be filled (textual 
argument, legislative history, patent 
incongruity, in harmony with new statute) are 
the sorts of arguments that courts use in 
resolving ambiguities.  Id. at 1848.  Justice 
Scalia concluded:   
“Rather than making our judicial-
review jurisprudence curiouser and 
curiouser, the Court should abandon 
the opinion that produces these 
contortions, Brand X.  I join the 
judgment announced by the Court 
because it is indisputable that 
Colony resolved the construction of 
the statutory language at issue 
here, and that construction must 
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therefore control.  And I join in 
the Court’s opinion except for part 
IV-C.”   
Id.    
C. THE DISSENT 
Justice Kennedy wrote the dissent, joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan.  
Essentially, these Justices agreed with the 
IRS that the amendments to the 1954 Code (the 
addition of (i) and the “items” provision in 
the estate and gift tax section) “may not 
compel the opposite conclusion under the new 
statute, but they strongly favor it.  As a 
result, there was room for the Treasury 
Department to interpret the new provision in 
that manner.”  Id. at 1851.   
In other words, the dissent agreed with the 
IRS’s position that “a judicial construction 
of an ambiguous statute did not foreclose an 
agency’s later, inconsistent interpretation of 
the same provision.”  Id.   The dissent would 
avoid saying that the IRS can overrule the 
prior Supreme Court decision in Colony by 
concluding that Colony did not interpret the 
same statute, with its amendments, as it is 
being interpreted today.  Justice Kennedy 
concluded that: 
The Court goes too far, in my 
respectful view, in constricting 
Congress’s ability to leave agencies 
in charge of filling statutory gaps. 
Id. at 1852.   
Thus, the dissent would give full effect to 
the new IRS regulations, which in turn would 
dictate that the six-year statute, not the 
three-year statute, applies in this case.  Id. 
at 1853.   
24 
 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The clear holding by the Home Concrete majority is 
that an overstatement of basis in sold property 
does not qualify as an “omission from gross 
income” for purposes of extending the period for 
assessment of a deficiency against a taxpayer from 
three years to six years.  This ruling should 
apply generally to “overstatement of basis” cases 
– not just Son-of-BOSS cases—unless another 
statutory exception applies.6  See, e.g., 
Wilmington Partners, LP, et al. v. Commissioner, 
2012 U.S. App. Lexis 18941(2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2012) 
(partnership’s increase in basis outside the 
context of Son-of-BOSS transactions did not 
qualify as an “omission from gross income” under 
26 U.S.C. § 6229(c)(2)).     
Beyond the specific holding of Home Concrete, the 
Supreme Court has left doubt as to the gap-filling 
authority of the IRS and other federal agencies by 
regulation in pre-Chevron cases.  The plurality 
would deny the agencies the authority to fill gaps 
where the pre-Chevron court examined the statute 
and gave it a clear interpretation under 
traditional rules of statutory construction, 
despite apparent ambiguity in the statutory 
language.  Justice Scalia would take a different 
approach by abandoning the ambiguous/unambiguous 
analysis in pre-Chevron cases altogether.  And 
four of the current Justices would grant the 
regulatory agencies authority to change the 
outcome of judicial decisions where the Court has 
found a relevant statutory ambiguity.  It remains 
to be seen which of these views will prevail in 
the future.   
                                                 
6 In 2004, Congress amended € 6501 by adding a new subsection (c) (10) which 
provides that, in the case of a “listed” transaction like “Son-of-BOSS,” the 
limitations period for assessing tax does not expire until one year after the 
taxpayer submits certain information.  However, this exception only applies 
to tax years with respect to which the period for assessing a deficiency “did 
not expire” before October 22, 2004.  
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As for post-Chevron cases, the message seems to be 
clear:  the best way to avoid unwanted agency 
regulation of areas within its expertise is for 
the court to find that Congress has addressed the 
precise question at issue by unambiguous statutory 
pronouncement.  
